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Abstract  
Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence.  These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough.  Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent.  These accounts make phenomenal content too specific.  My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right.  My account begins with John Searle’s suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier, and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva Noë.






Not so long ago, most philosophers of perception thought that, by itself, phenomenal character, or the ‘what it’s like’ aspect of perceptual experience, didn’t represent anything.​[2]​  In short, phenomenal character was thought to be inherently non-representational.  Today, however, Physicalists and Dualists alike are drawn to the idea that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is inherently representational.​[3]​  In this paper, I follow this trend and assume that visual experiences are ‘assessable for accuracy’ solely in virtue of their phenomenal character.​[4]​  Following the lead of Chalmers (2006), I will capture the idea that, by itself, the phenomenal character of a given visual experience presents the world as being a certain way using the notion of ‘phenomenal content’.​[5]​

…a representational content C of a perceptual experience E is a phenomenal content if and only if necessarily, any experience with the phenomenal character of E has representational content C.  (50-51)

Until very recently, the most popular account of the logical form of visual phenomenal content maintained that it involved an existential quantifier and various (bound) properties/relations.  This popular account has now come under fire.  It has been argued that ‘veridical illusions’, a phenomenon that will be explained in section 3, reveal that the phenomenal content of visual experience is more specific than such Existentialist accounts can allow.  This content is specific enough that, in cases of veridical illusion, it singles out the object that one is actually seeing.  One rival theory to Existentialism—Singularism—makes visual phenomenal content more specific by positing that it is a singular content that contains the object that is seen as a constituent.  But this position makes phenomenal content so specific that it entails that visual experiences of distinct, but qualitatively identical objects must carry distinct phenomenal contents.  I think this makes visual phenomenal content too specific.
I will treat these problems facing Existentialism and Singularism as motivation for finding an account of phenomenal content that occupies a middle ground: an account under which phenomenal content is specific enough to pick out the object that one is actually seeing in cases of veridical illusion, but not so specific that it entails that experiences of qualitatively identical objects must carry distinct phenomenal contents.  I will refer the project of finding such a middle ground as the ‘Goldilocks Problem’ of phenomenal content, for it is the project of developing an account that gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right.  
In this paper, I lay out the Goldilocks Problem and develop a new account that is Existentialist in spirit, although not in letter, that solves it.  With regard the latter project, I start with the idea, taken from John Searle (1983, 1991), that the content of visual experience represents an object as seen.  By examining and overcoming a series of objections to this idea, I develop a new account of phenomenal content that departs from Searle’s original account in two ways.  First, I reconfigure the logical form of this content so that the representation of an object’s being seen provides a characterization of that object that is independent of and prior to the characterization of it as having a particular color, shape, size, location, etc.  (This involves moving the relation of seeing an object outside the scope of the existential quantifier within the phenomenal content in question.)  Second, I replace Searle’s idea that visual experience represents objects as seen with the idea that they represent objects as accessible, as Alva Noë (2004) understands that notion. 
	
2. The traditional Existentialist account of phenomenal content
Consider two qualitatively indistinguishable golden retrievers: Tom and Tim.  If Tom and Tim are seen in exactly the same circumstances—e.g. if they are seen in the same egocentrically identified location, in front of the same background, etc.—a visual experience of one will be qualitatively indistinguishable from a visual experience of the other.  Given the assumptions that 1) qualitatively indistinguishable experiences possess the same phenomenal characters and 2) that phenomenal character is inherently representational (i.e. that there is ‘phenomenal content’, as defined in section 1), it follows that the experiences of Tom and Tim carry the same phenomenal content.  This means that neither Tom nor Tim can be a constituent of that content—it means that visual phenomenal content cannot be singular content.​[6]​  
If visual experiences of Tom (or Tim) do not carry singular contents, then what kind of content do they carry?  One traditionally popular answer claims the phenomenal content of visual experiences of Tom or Tim represent these objects via the existential quantifier and general properties—i.e. properties that can be instantiated by both Tom and Tim.​[7]​  According to this account, an experience of Tom carries a phenomenal content along the lines of—

(x)(x is golden, longhaired, dog-like, and before the eyes).​[8]​

The same is true of the phenomenal content of an experience of Tim.  For expositional purposes, I’ll refer to any account that understands the phenomenal content of visual experience in terms of an existentially quantified sentence containing general properties an ‘Existentialist’ account of phenomenal content.​[9]​ 

3. The New Lesson of veridical illusion, Singularism, and the Goldilocks Problem of phenomenal content
A recent objection to Existentialism involves a case that is meant to show that the phenomenal content of visual experience is more specific in its representation of objects than Existentialism can allow.​[10]​  The case in question involves what is called a ‘veridical illusion’.  Here is a description, taken from Michael Tye (2009), of the kind of case in question.​[11]​  

Suppose that I am looking directly ahead and that, unknown to me, there is a mirror in front of me placed at a 45 angle, and behind which there is a yellow cube.  Off to the right of the mirror, and reflected in it, is a white cube.  Through special lighting conditions, this cube appears yellow to me.  (79)

For expositional purposes, I’ll call this the ‘Two Cubes Case’ and I’ll refer to the yellow cube as ‘cube #1’ and to the white cube as ‘cube #2’. 
Before I explain how cases like this provide a challenge to Existentialism, I’d first like to say a bit about how these same cases were originally put to use in the history of the philosophy of perception.  Originally, cases like these—cases of veridical illusion—were used to motivate the causal theory of perception.​[12]​  The basic argument is as follows: Even though the (existentially quantified) content of the Two Cubes Experience—

(x)(x is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes)

—is made true (or ‘veridical’) by cube #1, it seems obvious that the subject of this experience is not actually perceiving cube #1.  This, in turn, shows that perceiving an object requires something more than just correctly representing it; perceiving requires that one’s experience be caused (in the right way) by the object perceived.​[13]​  Let’s call this the ‘Old Lesson’ of veridical illusion.  
The conceptual possibility of veridical illusions—visual experiences that correctly represent objects but which do not involve subjects actually perceiving those objects—is the result of a sharp distinction that the Existentialist draws between the question ‘is the content of a visual experience veridical?’ and the question ‘is the subject of that experience actually perceiving something and, if so, what?’​[14]​  For the Existentialist, the answer to the former question involves the truth-conditions of the existentially quantified content carried by visual experience; truth-conditions that, in the Two Cubes Case, only require that some yellow cube be before the eyes in order to be true.  The answer to the latter question, however, involves the presence or absence of a causal relation between the subject/experience and a particular object in the environment. 
Recently the same kind of scenario has been used to impart a different lesson, a lesson that only concerns the content of visual experience.  The ‘New Lesson’ of veridical illusion is that the phenomenal contents of our visual experiences do not attribute properties willy-nilly to any old object before the eyes; instead, they attribute properties to the object that is, in fact, seen.  This means that the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience carries more information about the object to which it is attributing yellowness, etc. than just that it is ‘some object’.  It carries enough information to ensure that yellowness, etc. is being attributed to a specific object: namely, cube #2, the cube that is seen.  This is the point Schellenberg (2010) is making when she says

…for an experience with the content ‘that coffee cup is white’ to be accurate it is not sufficient for ‘that’ to refer to some coffee cup instantiating the right properties.  It is necessary for ‘that’ to refer to the particular object perceived.  (22)

Since, in the Two Cubes Case, the object you are actually seeing—cube #2—isn’t yellow, it follows that the phenomenal content of your experience involves misrepresentation.  So even though there is a yellow cube before your eyes (cube #1), your experience does not correctly represent any of its properties; instead, it misrepresents the properties of the cube off to the right (cube #2) because that’s the cube that you are actually seeing.​[15]​  This, in turn, creates trouble for Existentialism, for according to that account there should be no misrepresentation in the Two Cubes Case.  In virtue of her account of the logical form of visual phenomenal content, the Existentialist appears destined to give an account where that content merely attributes properties/relations to some object.  This, in turn, means that any object’s instantiating those properties/relations—including, in the Two Cubes Case, the yellow cube behind the mirror (cube #1)—should be enough to make that content true.  
	I am going to accept the New Lesson: I am going to accept the claim that the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience is specific enough to select cube #2 as the object that is being represented as yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.​[16]​  One straightforward explanation of how this works would be to claim that the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience contains cube #2 as a constituent.  Under this approach, which I’ve been calling ‘Singularism’, visual experience carries a (Russellian) singular content that includes the seen object as a constituent.​[17]​  According to Singularism, the reason there is misrepresentation in the Two Cubes Experience is because the content of that experience is the Russellian singular proposition:
	
	Cube #2 is yellow, cubical, and straight-ahead.

In the Two Cubes Case, this content is false, for cube #2 is, in fact, the white cube located off to the right.   
Despite accommodating the New Lesson, the extreme specificity that Singularism attributes to visual phenomenal content raises some concerns.  Suppose that we removed the mirror from the Two Cubes Scenario and the subject had a (completely) veridical experience of cube #1.  According to Singularism, the phenomenal content of this experience would be distinct from the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience, despite the fact that these two experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable from one another, for the former content would contain cube #1 as a constituent whereas the latter content would contain cube #2 as a constituent.  For this reason, the Singularist cannot offer the kind of straightforward, intuitively satisfying analysis of the qualitative indistinguishability of certain visual experiences that the Existentialist can—she cannot say that such experiences are indistinguishable because they carry the same phenomenal content. 
Singularists are aware of this fact and, in response, have said a number of interesting things about how we should think about the indistinguishability of visual experiences.​[18]​  Rather than explore and evaluate these ideas, however, I am going to treat the ability to analyze the qualitative indistinguishability of experiences in terms of their carrying the same phenomenal content as a desideratum for my theory of phenomenal content.  Recall that the other desideratum I’ve set is to accommodate the claim that the Two Cube Experience carries information that is specific enough to select cube #2 as being the cube that is being attributed the properties of being yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.  (It is important to realize that the latter desideratum does not entail that the Two Cubes Experience must carry a phenomenal content that is distinct from the content carried by an experience of cube #1 when the mirror is removed.  Instead, it only requires that each experience carry enough information to select out the particular cube that the subject is actually seeing in each scenario.)  
As a result of pursuing both of these goals, I will be aiming for a theory that places the specificity of visual phenomenal content somewhere in the middle of a spectrum that has, as its two ends, the (traditional) Existentialist account and the Singularist account.  This puts me in a position akin to that of Goldilocks as she searches for the perfect bowl of porridge: Singularism leaves us with a conception of phenomenal content that is too specific, while Existentialism leaves us with a conception that is not specific enough.  What’s needed is an account of phenomenal content that gets its specificity just right—i.e. an account where phenomenal content is specific enough to pick out the object that is seen in the Two Cubes Case (i.e. cube #2) as being the object that is being represented as yellow, cubical, and before the eyes, but not so specific that it entails that experiences of qualitatively indistinguishable objects must carry distinct phenomenal contents.  For this reason, I’ll refer to the project of finding such an account as the ‘Goldilocks Problem’ of phenomenal content.  
If Existentialism (as that position was described in section 2) and Singularism exhausted the possibilities with regard to specificity of phenomenal content, it would be impossible to solve the Goldilocks Problem.  Fortunately, there is more room in the logical space of possible (and actual) theories of phenomenal content than just Existentialism (as described so far) and Singularism.  In the next section, I’ll quickly consider another extant account of the logical form of visual phenomenal content that is currently receiving some discussion: the demonstrative account.  Although there are significant differences between this account and both Existentialism and Singularism, I’ll show that the demonstrative account ultimately yields an account where phenomenal content is at the same level of specificity as it is under the Existentialist account.  This, in turn, means that the demonstrative account fails to solve the Goldilocks Problem.

4. The demonstrative account and the Goldilocks Problem of phenomenal content 
In contrast to both Existentialism and Singularism, Tyler Burge (1991) posits that visual experience carries a type of demonstrative content.  The Two Cubes Experience, for instance, carries content akin to:

That is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes 

where ‘That’ is a demonstrative element whose reference is determined by context.  In cases where one perceives an object, the referent of ‘That’ is the object perceived.  So in the Two Cube case, the referent of this demonstrative element would be cube #2.  This makes the truth-evaluable content of the Two Cubes Experience false, which is the intuitively correct result.
In cases of (successful) perception, the truth-conditions of Burge’s demonstrative contents will involve particular objects.  This does not mean, however, that veridical visual experiences of Tom and Tim must carry different contents.  Nor does it mean that a veridical experience and a hallucination must carry different contents.  For although these experiences carry different truth-evaluable contents, they can carry the same demonstrative content.  This, in turn, is a significant difference between Burge’s demonstrative account and the Singularist account.  According to Burge’s account, visual experiences of twins like Tom and Tim can carry the same kind of content: a demonstrative content.  According to the Singularist account, in contrast, these experiences must carry different singular contents—one containing Tom as a constituent, the other containing Tim as a constituent.
With this in mind, let’s turn to the topic at hand: the specificity of the phenomenal content of our visual experiences.  To answer the question ‘how specific is phenomenal content under Burge’s account?’, we first need to answer the question ‘what semantic entity would Burge identify as being the phenomenal content of visual experience?’  As we’ve seen, Burge thinks that visual experiences of distinct objects (like Tom and Tim) can have the same phenomenal character.  He also thinks that veridical experience and hallucination can have the same phenomenal character.  Recall that that notion of ‘phenomenal content’ is a notion of representational content that is determined entirely by the phenomenal character of visual experience—two experiences that have the same phenomenal character are guaranteed to have the same phenomenal content.  Given this, it seems that under Burge’s account we will need to identify the phenomenal content of visual experience with a semantic entity that can be had in common between visual experiences of twins like Tom and Tim, and with a semantic entity that can be had in common between veridical experience and hallucination.  In short, we need to identify phenomenal content with the ‘unfilled’ demonstrative content carried by these experiences.
So how specific is phenomenal content, given that it involves this type of semantic entity?  Although the demonstrative account offers a different take on the logical form of phenomenal content than that given by Existentialism, Burge’s account seems to agree with the Existentialist account that phenomenal content is not specific enough to separate twins such as Tom and Tim.  To be clear, Burge thinks the phenomenal content of this experience—an ‘unfilled’ demonstrative content—plays an important role in determining a type of truth-evaluable content that includes particular objects (such as Tom or Tim) as constituents.  But, for reasons we’ve just discussed, Burge cannot identify the phenomenal content of visual experience with the singular content that it helps to determine.  
Once this point is grasped, it seems that Burge’s account cannot accommodate the claim that the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience is specific enough to select out cube #2.  Although the Two Cubes Experience carries a truth-evaluable content—a ‘filled’ demonstrative content—that is specific enough to select cube #2 (in virtue of containing cube #2 as a constituent), this more specific truth-evaluable content is not determined solely by the phenomenal character of experience; it is not a phenomenal content, as Chalmers defines the notion.  What’s more, it’s not clear how, on its own, a phenomenal content like

That is yellow, cubical, and before the eye

could contain information that is specific enough to select cube #2 as being the object to which yellowness, cubicity, and a spatial location are being attributed. 
I’m not the only one who thinks that there is no interesting difference between Burge and the Existentialist on this score.  Michael Martin (2002) makes the same point when he says of Burge’s account of qualitatively identical twins that, although there is a difference in content between our experiences of each these twins, ‘…that difference is not reflected in the phenomenal nature of the experience.’  (193)  As a result, Martin claims that Burge’s account ‘…no more respects the intuition that the character of a particular episode involves particular objects than does Davies’ account in terms of existentially quantified general truth conditions.’ (193)​[19]​  In short, Burge’s account, like the Existentialist’s account, does not accommodate the New Lesson of veridical illusion when that lesson is applied to the phenomenal content of visual experience.​[20]​
	So although there are significant differences between Burge’s demonstrative account and both Singularism and Existentialism, none of these differences seem to matter much with regard to the Goldilocks Problem of phenomenal content. To solve the Goldilocks Problem, we need a new account of the logical form of phenomenal content.  

5.  Supplementing Existentialism
The inspiration from my solution to the Goldilocks Problem comes from an Existentialist account that adds additional general properties to the content of visual experience in an attempt to make that content more specific.  (We might call such an approach to the New Lesson ‘Supplemented Existentialism’.)  The obvious move to make in this context is to follow the lead of John Searle (1983, 1991) and claim that part of what the Two Cubes Experience represents is that there is a yellow cube that stands in a causal relation—the causal relation necessary for seeing that cube—to one’s experience of it.  For expositional simplicity, I’ll refer to this causal relation as ‘causal relation S’.  According to this approach, the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience would be something like:

(x)(x is yellow, cubical, before the eyes, and stands in causal relation S to this experience)   

Such an account yields the intuitively correct result of a false content in the Two Cubes Case, for in that scenario there is no single object that is yellow, cubical, before the eyes, and seen.  And yet this content is not so specific that an experience of Tim is guaranteed to carry a different phenomenal content than an experience of Tom.  For these reasons, causal relation S may initially seem like the right kind of thing to solve the Goldilocks Problem—it makes the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience more specific by ‘zeroing-in’ on cube #2 in a way that doesn’t involve making cube #2 an actual constituent of that phenomenal content.  
Closer examination, however, reveals some substantial problems for an Existentialist account that is supplemented in this manner.  To start with, even though such an account yields the intuitively correct truth-value in the Two Cubes Case, it fails to do justice to the core intuition that is behind, and driving, the New Lesson.  As we saw in section 3, the reason there is misrepresentation in the Two Cubes Case is because visual experience carries information that is specific enough to select cube #2 (the cube you are actually seeing) as the object that is being represented as yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.  The basic problem facing Existentialism is that it yields an account where phenomenal content attributes general properties to some object while saying nothing about which object is being represented as having those general properties.  It’s not clear how adding another property or relation—in this case, causal relation S—to the list of general properties/relations bound by the existential quantifier helps with this problem, for such a property/relation will just be another property/relation that an existentially quantified content attributes to some object.​[21]​  
Here’s another way to appreciate the problem: the fact that, under the traditional Existentialist accounts described in section 2, yellowness is one of the properties bound by the existential quantifier doesn’t mean that phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience is attributing the property of being cubical and the relation of being before the eyes to something that is actually yellow.  The representation of yellowness does not provide an specification of the object that allows the phenomenal content in question to independently zero-in upon that object and then ascribe both the property of being cubical and the relation of being before the eyes to it.  Similarly, merely adding causal relation S to the list of properties/relations bound by the existential quantifier doesn’t mean that this content is now attributing the properties of being yellow, being cubical, and the relation of being before the eyes to something that is actually seen.  Instead, the latter is just another property/relation that the experience is attributing to some object, an object that is (still) not independently specified, by that content, in any way.​[22]​  The take away lesson is that to fully accommodate the New Lesson, an Existentialist would need an account in which phenomenal content carries additional information about the object it represents, information that zeroes-in on the seen object in question and which is also independent of the information about that object that is conveyed via the bound properties/relations following the quantifier.  
There are additional problems facing an Existentialist account that supplements phenomenal content by adding causal relation S into the mix; objections that assert, in one way or another, that adding causal relation S to the phenomenal content of visual experience makes that content too complex.  For expositional simplicity, I’ll focus on three specific objections that fall under this general umbrella recently given by Michael Tye (2009).  For expositional ease, I’ll refer to these objections as ‘Tye’s Objections’ although Tye is not the only person to have expressed such concerns.​[23]​   
The first of these objections is that including causal relation S within the content of visual experience makes that content partly self-referential.  But this is at odds with the introspectively plausible claim that visual experience is ‘transparent’ to the act of introspection.​[24]​  
The second objection focuses on the fact that the causal relation in question is the relation that obtains between an experience and an object when the subject sees that object.  Not just any old causal relation that happens to obtain between an object and a subject’s experience of that object is sufficient for that subject to count as having seen that object.  To avoid deviant causal relations—i.e. causal relations between an object and an experience that are not sufficient for seeing—causal relation S will need to be represented in enough detail in order for the subject to tell whether the causal relation between the object and the experience is appropriate or deviant.  But, as Tye (2009) points out, ‘…the conditions needed to spell out non-deviance are surely not ones that are perceptually available.’ (80, his emphasis)  
The third objection is that accounts that posit causal relation S as part of the phenomenal content of visual experience seems to confuse the truth conditions of the sentence ‘X sees Y’ with the representational content of that visual experience.  In general, conditions necessary for a type of knowledge (in this case, seeing) are not, themselves, literally part of the content of that knowledge.  
	Now that I’ve laid out a series of objections facing Existentialist accounts that attempt to accommodate the New Lesson by including causal relation S among the relations bound by the quantifier, I will develop a new account that retains the idea that part of what visual experiences represent is a relation between the perceiving subject and the seen object while avoiding the objections leveled against Supplemented Existentialism above.
 
6. Developing a new account: Embedded Existentialism
We’ve just seen that adding causal relation S to list of general properties bound by the existential quantifier results in a phenomenal content that still only attributes properties to some object.  What’s needed is a logical form of phenomenal content that provides an independent specification of the object to which our experience is attributing color, shape, and location.  Given the goals I’ve set, however, this independent specification cannot involve including the object itself as a constituent of that content, as the Singularist does.  
To get a sense of how we might accomplish these goals, consider a modification that brings us from the Supplemented Existential content





This experience stands in causal relation S to some object that is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes

or, to express the same content another way

This experience stands in causal relation S to an object that satisfies the follow general logical condition: (x)(x is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes).   


Strictly speaking, this isn’t an Existentialist account of visual phenomenal content, for the phenomenal content in question is not fully captured by a single, existentially quantified sentence.  But I think it’s fair to think of it Existentialist in spirit, for it retains the basic idea that visual experience attributes colors, shapes, and locations to some object.  For lack of a better name, I’ll call it ‘Embedded Existentialism’ since it involves a content that contains, as an element, an existentially quantified sentence.
Unlike both the traditional forms of Existentialism and Supplemented Existentialism, Embedded Existentialism provides specification of the object to which our experience is attributing yellowness, cubicity, and a spatial location that is independent (and, in a sense, prior to) of the attribution those properties/relations via the existential quantifier.  The content described above does more than just attribute yellowness, cubicity, and a spatial location to some object; it attributes these properties/relations to an object that stands in causal relation S to your experience.  In effect, this content ‘tells’ us that it is attributing these properties to a specific cube: namely, a cube that is seen.  This allows the Embedded Existentialist account to accommodate the New Lesson in a more satisfying manner than Supplemented Existentialism.
Unlike the Singularist account, the Embedded Existentialist account does not accommodate the New Lesson by claiming that cube #2 is a constituent of visual phenomenal content.  Although it makes phenomenal content specific enough in the Two Cubes Case to single out cube #2 as being the object to which your experience is attributing yellowness, cubicity, etc., it doesn’t do so in a way that guarantees that visual experiences of qualitatively indistinguishable objects will carry distinct phenomenal contents.  To see the latter point, let’s return to Tom and Tim, the qualitatively identical golden retrievers.  According to Embedded Existentialism, a visual experience of Tom will carry the same phenomenal content as a visual experience of Tim, namely:

This experience stands in causal relation some object that is golden, longhaired, dog-like, and before the eyes.


Similarly, the Two Cubes Experience and the visual experience you’d have of cube #1 (if the mirror was removed) will both carry that same phenomenal content, namely:

This experience stands in causal relation S to some object that is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.

For these reasons, Embedded Existentialism seems to posit phenomenal content at the right level of specificity to solve the Goldilocks Problem.  Despite this advantage, this account still runs afoul of Tye’s Objections.  In various ways, these objections accuse any account that includes causal relation S within the phenomenal content of experience of making that content too complicated.  Tye’s Objections stick regardless of whether causal relation S is bound by an existential quantifier (as it is under Supplemented Existentialism) or not bound by an existential quantifier (as it is in Embedded Existentialism).  So to complete my new account of phenomenal content, I need to find a way to respond to these objections.  
To do so, I will make a second modification to my account; a modification on top of the first modification that involved using causal relation S to provide independent specification of the object that is being represented as yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.  Although I will continue to maintain that the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience has the following basic logical form

This experience stands in relation R to some object that is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes

I will offer a new account of ‘relation R’, an account that does not fall prey to Tye’s Objections.  (Actually, as you’ll see, I’ll claim that it is the subject, and not the subject’s experience, that stands in relation R to some object that is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.)
	Towards that end, consider the sense of access present in the phenomenal character of our visual experiences.  Not only do our visual experiences represent various objects/features of the surrounding environment in high detail, they also tell us that other objects/features are accessible to the conscious mind and could easily be represented in high detail in subsequent visual experiences.  This idea finds clear expression in the work of Alva Noë (2004): 

The content of a perceptual experience is not given all at once the way the content of a picture is given in the picture all at once…I have a sense of the visual presence of the detailed scene before me, even though it is not the case that I see all that detail (or that I think I can see it all).  As a matter of phenomenology, the detail is present not as represented, but as accessible.  (215, his emphasis)


This holds true even in the case of seeing a single object.  Consider, for example, a visual experience of a single tomato.

…you do not, as a matter of fact, have the whole of the facing side of the tomato in consciousness all at once.  The facing side has extent and shape and color, and you can’t embrace all this detail in consciousness all at once… Take a tomato out.  Look at it.  Yes, you have a sense that the facing side of the tomato is all there, all at once.  But if you are careful you will admit that you don’t actually experience every part even of its visible surface all at once.  Your eyes scan the surface, and you direct your attention to this or that.  (217, his emphasis)

The reason some of the fine-grained details of the tomato are only ‘present as accessible’ within visual experience is because the visual system is limited in terms of the high quality representation that it can generate at a given moment.  These limitations arise from several sources, one of which involves the physiology of the eye.  Due to an uneven distribution of cones across the retina, only an area of about 2 degrees (approximately the size of a thumbnail at arm’s length) of the visual field can be represented in high detail.​[25]​   As a result, at any given moment most of the surrounding environment is represented by lower-detail representation ‘parafoveal’ representation.  
Another limitation relevant to details of the tomato being ‘present as accessible’ involves visual attention.  Visual attention is the second stage of a two-stage process.  In the first stage, the low-level visual features of a scene (color, orientation, etc.) are registered by parallel processing.  The second stage, in turn, involves the selective deployment of a more limited capacity to represent the high-level visual features of that scene (faces, objects, etc.).  Stimuli processed by this later, more limited stage of visual processing—i.e. stimuli that are attended—are reacted to more quickly, register at a lower threshold, register more accurately, are represented in higher detail, and are more likely to be remembered than the stimuli that are processed only by the first stage.​[26]​  
A final limitation of the visual system that is relevant here involves the spatial extent of attention.  In virtue of being a limited, selective capacity, visual attention is often compared to a spotlight that can illuminate only a portion of the field of vision at any particular moment.  Empirical studies have revealed that the spotlight of attention is adjustable.  As visual attention expands to encompass a larger area of the surrounding space there are fewer computational resources allocated to each signal from that area.​[27]​  As a result, there is a trade-off between the size of the spotlight of attention and the response times to (and the resolution of) the objects ‘illuminated’ by attention.​[28]​  In this way, visual attention actually behaves more like the zoom lens of a camera than like a spotlight.​[29]​
The visual system compensates for these limitations by rapidly shifting the fovea (the small area at the center of the retina that contains the highest concentrations of cones), rapidly shifting visual attention, and rapidly adjusting the zoom lens of attention in and out.  The low-detail representations generated by parafoveal, pre-attentive, and/or low-resolution representations (i.e. representations formed by the wider, lower resolution settings of the zoom lens of attention) play a crucial role in this process in that they provide a low-cost preview of various regions of the surrounding space that helps guide the deployment of our more limited high-level, high-detail visual resources in exploring that space.  
From a teleological standpoint, these lower-detail representations perform an important double-duty: (1) they represent, in low detail, various objects in the surrounding environment and, (2) in virtue of engendering dispositions to shift fixation or to shift or narrow attention to these objects, they represent high-grained details of those objects as accessible.  Some of these low-detail representations are conscious states—there is something that it’s like to have them.​[30]​  The second duty of such representations, in turn, is reflected in what it’s like to have them—it is why we have a sense of detail being ‘present as accessible’ within visual experience.​[31]​  
As we’ve seen, the second duty of the low-detail conscious representations described above is to engender fast access—via shifts of fixation and attention—to the additional high-grained details of objects.  In the Two Cubes Case, when the subject uses these lower-detail representations to shift fixation/attention and further explore the yellow cube she seems to see, the object she will be acquiring additional higher-detail information from is, in fact, cube #2.  Of course, this object is not actually located where her lower-detail and higher-detail representations say that it is; unbeknownst to the subject, the cube she is exploring with her shifts of fixation and attention is off to the right, not straight ahead.  And due to the lighting conditions, the object is also not the color that it appears to be.  But with regard to the question of whether she has the kind of sensory ‘access’ to an object that I’m talking about, what matters is whether the shifts of fixation/attention that are engendered by the relevant lower-detail conscious representations enable her to acquire additional high-detail information about an object formerly represented only in low detail.  And in the Two Cubes Case, our subject does indeed have such ‘access’ to additional high-detail information about cube #2 via these shifts of fixation/attention.  It’s just that this object is not where she thinks it is, nor is it the color she thinks it is.  
With this in mind, let’s plug the relation of ‘accessibility’ into the Embedded Existentialist schema for phenomenal content.  In the case of the Two Cubes Experience, the resultant content would be:

I have access to some object that is yellow, cubical, and before the eyes.

Now consider what this account of the logical form of the phenomenal content of visual experience brings to the table.  Like the traditional forms of Existentialism discussed in section 2, this new account does not make phenomenal content too specific.  The content schema listed above would not distinguish qualitatively identical objects (such as Tom and Tim) from one another if each were seen in exactly the same setting.  What’s more, both veridical experience and hallucination could carry this content.​[32]​  In this manner, the account meets one of the desiderata that I’ve set: it analyzes the qualitative indistinguishability of certain experiences in terms of those experiences carrying the same phenomenal content.
This account also has the resources to do full justice to the intuition behind the New Lesson of veridical illusion.  To accommodate this lesson, the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience must provide enough information to pick out the object that is actually seen: cube #2.  Under the Embedded Existentialist account given above, the phenomenal content of the Two Cubes Experience ‘tells us’ that it is attributing the properties of yellowness, cubicity, and a spatial location to the object the subject can explore (and perhaps is exploring) using guided shifts of fixation and attention.  As it turns it, the object that can be explored in this manner—the object that is ‘present as accessible’ within her experience—is the object that is seen: cube #2.  The same will hold true for most every case of veridical illusion—the object to which you seem to have access in these cases will, in fact, be the object that you are seeing.​[33]​
Now let’s turn to Tye’s Objections.  To start with, this new account doesn’t have the same problem accommodating the claim of transparency as an account, like Searle’s, which invokes causal relation S as an element of phenomenal content.  For under our new account, a visual experience of a tomato does not make one aware of a causal relation between the tomato and one’s experience of the tomato.  Instead, it makes one aware of having further access to the details of the tomato, access that is provided by one’s lower-detail conscious awareness of features of the tomato, and not by one’s introspective awareness of the experience of the tomato.  
	To be fair, the low-detail representations that provide access to the tomato do more than just represent this object; they also enable various dispositions involving shifts of fixation/attention that would allow the subject to rapidly acquire higher-detail information about the tomato.  As a result of performing this double-duty, part of the phenomenal character contributed by these representations includes an awareness of the possibility of acquiring additional higher-detail information about objects via certain types of action—i.e. shifts of fixation and attention.  (Recall that this is the introspectible sense of additional detail being ‘present as accessible’.)  Does this introspective awareness of the potential of acquiring additional higher-detail information via types of visual action constitute a threat to transparency? 
I don’t think so, for two reasons.  First, defenders of transparency typically target accounts that maintain that introspection reveals intrinsic properties of experience or intrinsic properties of non-physical objects (sense-data).​[34]​  The objectionable features of such theories are not mirrored in the account of accessibility given above.  To explain the second reason why I don’t think this account of information being ‘present as accessible’ threatens the claim of transparency, I want to draw an analogy with Evans’ (1982) account of the spatial content of perceptual experiences.  Evans claims that the spatial content of experiences is specified, in part, in terms of the potential for various bodily movements.  For example, when you hear a sound as coming from over there, the location of that sound is specified, in part, in terms of the bodily movements that would allow you to face or move towards the location in question.  Suppose, for sake of argument, that we accept Evans’ theory.  In doing so, have we denied the transparency of experience? Although the spatial content of our perceptual experiences is specified, in part, by potential bodily movements and, as a result, involves an introspective awareness of the potential for such movements, I suspect that most philosophers would not think that the resultant theory violates the claim of transparency.  If introspective awareness of the potential for types of bodily movement in this case is not a violation of transparency, I don’t see why introspective awareness of the potential for shifts of fixation and of attention would be a violation of transparency in the case that I’m talking about.
The second of Tye’s Objections was that the conditions needed to separate whether the causal relation between experience and object was appropriate or deviant are not perceptually available.  Since, under the new account, we are no longer claiming that phenomenal content represents the causal relation necessary for seeing, this concern falls to the wayside.  
The third of Tye’s Objections was that including causal relation S in the phenomenal content of visual experience is ad hoc—it involves conflating the truth conditions of the statement ‘X sees Y’ with the veridicality conditions of the visual experience that X possesses.  Including the relation of accessibility in the phenomenal content of visual experience strikes me as considerably less ad hoc.  The job of the vision is to represent objects in the surrounding environment.  Due to the representational limitations of the visual system, however, the visual system can’t represent the fine-grained details of an object all at once.  Given this, it’s not surprising that, at any given moment, the visual system represents what fine-grained details it can and represents some of the rest ‘as accessible’.  In this way, it makes sense for an organism with a limited visual system (like ours) to have visual experiences that represent objects as accessible. 

7. Conclusion
	I began this paper with a recent challenge to Existentialist accounts of phenomenal content: the New Lesson of veridical illusion.  This lesson reveals that phenomenal content does more than just attribute properties and relations to some object, it attributes properties/relations to the object that is seen.  One account that makes phenomenal content specific enough to do this is Singularism, which claims that phenomenal content is a singular content that contains the seen object as a constituent.  The problem with Singularism, however, is that it makes phenomenal content too specific.  The challenge facing us—the Goldilocks Problem—is to develop an account of phenomenal content of visual experience that gets its specificity just right: an account where visual phenomenal content is specific enough to select out the seen object—cube #2—in the Two Cubes Experience, but not so specific that it entails that experiences of qualitatively indistinguishable objects must carry distinct phenomenal contents.
	Taking my inspiration from John Searle’s version of Supplemented Existentialism, I’ve developed an account of phenomenal content that, among other things, contains a general relation obtaining between the subject and seen object as a constituent.  Unlike Searle, however, I do not maintain that this relation is the relation of seeing.  Instead, I maintain that it is the relation of accessibility.  This modification of Searle’s account allows me to circumvent Tye’s Objections.  In addition, I have not added this relation to the list of general properties bound by the existential quantifier, as Searle does in his Supplemented Existentialist account.  Instead, I’ve constructed the content in such a way that the relation of accessibility provides an independent characterization of the object to which a certain shape, color, and location is being attributed to.  This Embedded Existentialist account, in turn, allows me to accommodate the New Lesson.
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^1	  Email: rschroer@d.umn.edu
^2	 Notes This expression comes from Nagel (1974).
^3	  See, for example, Dretske 1995; Tye 1995, 2000; Harman 1990; Loar 2003; Chalmers 2004, 2006; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Siewert 1998.  This trend towards thinking of phenomenal character as representational is not universal; for the opposing viewpoint, see Travis 2004.
^4	  I borrow this expression from Siewert (1998).
^5	  One nice feature of Chalmers’ (2006) notion of ‘phenomenal content’ is that it is neutral with regard to many hotly contested issues, including the debate over whether phenomenal content is ‘narrow’ or ‘wide’ and the debate over which notion—‘content’ or ‘phenomenology’—is the more fundamental of the two.  For a discussion of the former debate, see Lycan 2001; for my two cents on that debate, see Schroer 2009.  For a discussion of the latter issue, see Chalmers 2004.  
^6	  For similar arguments against the idea that visual phenomenal content is singular, see Davies 1992; Soteriou 2000; Martin 2002.  
^7	  The appeal to general properties rules out accounts of the logical form of phenomenal content that appeal to the existential quantifier and ‘particularizing’ predicates, like Quine’s (1948) ‘pegasizes’, which can be truly predicated of only one object.  
^8	  To be clear, there is a debate about whether the content of perceptual experiences exclusively represents low-level features (such as colors and shapes) or whether it also represents high-level features (such as kind properties, etc.)  For an introduction to this debate, see Siegel 2010.  I will take no stand on this issue in this paper.
^9	  Existentialists include McGinn 1982; Davies 1992; Tye 1995, 2000; Chalmers 2006.
^10	  Another objection made against Existentialism is that, simply in virtue of its phenomenal content, visual experience puts us in a position to think singular thoughts about objects in the surrounding environment, thoughts where the objects in question are not thought of under the description ‘the/some object that looks so and so’.  For discussions of this objection, see Bach 2007; Martin 2002; Campbell 2002.  An investigation of the merits of this objection against Existentialism will have to wait for another day.
^11	  For similar cases, see Soteriou 2000 and Martin 2002.
^12	  See, for example, Grice 1961.
^13	  The question of what, in addition to correctly representing an object, is required for you to perceive it is actually more controversial than I’ve made it seem.  While some argue that the object must cause your experience of it (Grice 1961), others argue that your experience must carry information about the object (Dretske 1981), and yet others argue that your experience must stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence to the object (Lewis 1980).  Fortunately, I do not need to take a stand on which of these relations is necessary for seeing in order to run the arguments of this paper.  That said, for expositional simplicity I will act as though the causal relation is necessary for seeing.
^14	  For more on this distinction, see Soteriou 2000.
^15	  Notice that there is a tension between the Old Lesson’s and the New Lesson’s accounts of the truth-value of visual phenomenal content in the Two Cubes Case.  The Old Lesson—i.e. the lesson that perceiving requires more than just correct representation—assumes that content of the Two Cubes Experience is veridical.  The New Lesson, in contrast, assumes that this same experience carries a false content.
^16	  Existentialists could, of course, take the hard line and simply reject the New Lesson; they could argue, much in the spirit of the Old Lesson of Veridical Illusion, that the New Lesson conflates the question ‘what does it take for my visual experience of an object to be veridical’ with the question ‘what does it take for me to perceive an object?’  Both Millar (1991) and Martin (2002) suggest this as a defensive move for the Existentialist.
^17	  For discussions of this idea, see Soteriou 2000 and Tye 2009.
^18	  See, for example, Soteriou 2000; Tye 2009; Martin 2004.
^19	  Earlier in his piece, Martin identifies Davies (1992) as defending the kind of traditional Existentialist account that was discussed in section 2 of this paper.
^20	  I think the same holds true of ‘gappy accounts’ that maintain that visual experience carries a content akin to a Russellian singular content, except that it contains a gap where the object would go.  For discussions of the basic idea behind the gappy account, see Bach 2007; Tye 2009; Siegel 2010.  For someone who treats these ‘gappy’ contents in Fregean, not Russellian, terms, see Schellenberg 2010.
^21	  For other descriptions of this same objection, see Bach 2007 and Tye 2009. 
^22	  I want to thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
^23	  For additional discussion of these and related objections, see Armstrong 1991 and Burge 1991.  For some responses to these objections, see Searle 1991.
^24	  For discussions and interpretations of the claim of transparency, see Harman 1990; Tye 1995, 2000; Schroer 2007.
^25	  Motion sensitivity, in contrast, improves as you move toward the periphery of the visual field.
^26	  Useful summaries of the enormous psychological literature on visual attention can be found in Pashler 1998 and Palmer 2002.  
^27	  For more information, see Erickson and St. James 1986.
^28	  See Erickson and Yeh 1985 and Erickson and St. James 1986.
^29	  There are more debates surrounding attention than just whether it is best thought in terms of a spotlight or a zoom lens.  There is, for instance, debate about whether visual attention is directed at regions of space (where everything within the region is equally ‘illuminated’ by the spotlight of attention) or whether it is directed at objects (in which case the spotlight of attention could ‘illuminate’ one object while not illuminating another object despite those two objects residing in the same space).  For an introductory discussion of this debate, see Palmer 2002.
^30	  Some find the claim that some pre-attentive representations are conscious states to be controversial.  Mack and Rock (1998), in particular, think that visual consciousness is limited to only stimuli that are attended—i.e. there is nothing that it is like to pre-attentively represent stimuli.  I lack the space in this paper to fully engage with Mack and Rock’s position.  For the examples of the kinds of objections against their position that I find persuasive, see Wolfe 1999; Rensink 2000; Moore 2001.
^31	  Although it borrows much from the work of Noë, my account of how details of external objects are ‘present as accessible’ within experience is not exactly the same as his. I maintain that in order for an object to be ‘present as accessible’ within visual experience there must be a conscious representation that gives us a low-detail preview of that object.  Noë, in contrast, thinks that we only need to have ‘sensorimotor knowledge’ of how various changes in behavior would result in new representations of the object and/or its features.  According to Noë, then, an object can be ‘present as accessible’ even if there is no current conscious representation of that object.
^32	  This assumes that one could undergo a hallucination where one has the sense of shifting fixation/attention and, as a result, of receiving additional high-detail information about some object.  (For an argument that a neuroscientist could not induce such a hallucination in a subject, see Dennett 1991.)
^33	  This is not to say that every time we see an object, we will be able to further ‘access’ it. It’s possible to have a momentary experience that allows you to see something without giving you the opportunity to further examine that object via shifts of fixation and attention.  This is also not to say that every time we seem to have ‘access’ to an object—every time we seem capable of exploring an object with shifts of fixation and attention—we must actually be seeing an object.  It may seem to a brain in a vat that it can further explore an object using shifts of fixation and attention even though, strictly speaking, it is seeing nothing.
^34	  For an example of the former, see Tye 2000; for an example of the latter, see Harman 1990.
